LC-1 · Kinematic Threat Briefs

Kinematic Threat Brief

# Kinematic Threat Brief

**LRRK Watch / Open-Source Intelligence** — Five current signals across systems that sense, move, and act.

| Field | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Collection cutoff | 31 August 2017 |
| Platform | Quiet Systems |
| Data label | Open-source intelligence // LRRK analytic product |
| Handling | Public-source material. Image rights require separate verification before publication. |

## Executive read

### BLUF

August made the market-leading consumer UAS a U.S. Army cyber-physical contraband: Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson’s 2 August memo ordered units to cease all use of DJI products and any system with DJI components or software — citing classified ARL (25 May) and Navy (24 May) papers — after the Aviation Engineering Directorate had already issued more than 300 airworthiness releases for DJI.

### Key judgments

1. **[Assessment — high confidence]** Fetched memo text (sUAS News) and Defense One 4 August confirmation by two Army officials: “Cease all use, uninstall all DJI applications, remove all batteries/storage media from devices, and secure equipment for follow on direction.” Applies to flight computers, cameras, radios, batteries, ESCs, GPS, handhelds, and devices with DJI apps.
2. **[Assessment — high confidence]** Memo: DJI is “the most widely used non-program of record commercial off-the-shelf UAS employed by the Army”; 300+ AWRs; Army spokesperson confirmed guidance was issued, “reviewing… cannot comment further.”
3. **[Inference — moderate confidence]** The trust failure is supply-chain and telemetry, not a lost airframe: a Shenzhen Control Fabric was inside U.S. mission sets, including — per a former soldier quoted — special-operations use in Syria.

### Analytic labels

- **Fact** — verified reporting or primary record
- **Assessment** — analytic judgment
- **Inference** — reasoned but not directly observed
- **Uncertainty** — unresolved information gap

### Source grades

- **A1** — authoritative primary record / directly confirmed
- **B1–B2** — generally reliable and corroborated
- **C3** — useful but requires caution

## 01. 2 August memo — halt DJI, bag the batteries

*Event / publication dates: memo 2 August 2017; sUAS News / Defense One 4–5 August*

**Verified record — [Fact — A1]** DAMO-AV memorandum for record, Office of the DCS G-3/5/7, 2 August 2017, SUBJECT: Discontinue Use of Dajiang Innovation (DJI) Corporation Unmanned Aircraft Systems. References: ARL report 25 May 2017 (classified); Navy memo 24 May 2017. Direction as quoted. POC G-3/5/7 Aviation Directorate. Signed Joseph Anderson, LTG, GS. Fetched: https://www.suasnews.com/2017/08/us-army-calls-units-discontinue-use-dji-equipment/ and https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/08/us-army-just-ordered-soldiers-stop-using-drones-chinas-dji/139999/

**Threat landscape.** COTS Sense is now a classified-vulnerability object. Uninstall-and-secure is a chain-of-custody Control Fabric, not a firmware patch.

**Intelligence assessment.** [Assessment — high confidence] The order is real and Army-wide as written. [Inference — moderate confidence] “Cyber vulnerabilities” is deliberately unspecified. [Uncertainty] Other-service follow-on this month not fetched.

**Opportunity.** An unclassified findings annex.

**LRRK relevance.** Control Fabric / Passport / Lab / Kestrel / Watch.

**Confidence.** High on the order text.

## 02. 300 airworthiness releases — DJI was already inside the force

*Event / publication dates: 2 August memo background paragraph*

**Verified record — [Fact — A1]** “The Army Aviation Engineering Directorate has issued over 300 separate Airworthiness Releases for DJI products in support of multiple organizations with a variety of mission sets.” Defense One: amends February 2015 domestic unmanned-systems guidance; Pumas/Switchblades remain the tactical POR; Fort Hood PA shop example of licensed remote pilots.

**Threat landscape.** Three hundred waivers mean the ban is an inventory and storage problem, not a hypothetical.

**Intelligence assessment.** [Assessment — high confidence] 300+ AWRs is the Army’s own number. [Uncertainty] How many airframes that is.

**Opportunity.** An AWR serial list.

**LRRK relevance.** Passport / Control Fabric.

**Confidence.** High on the 300 figure as spoken.

## 03. DJI response — not consulted

*Event / publication dates: Michael Perry to sUAS News; Reuters 7 August family*

**Verified record — [Fact — B1]** Perry: “surprised and disappointed… unprompted restriction… not consulted… happy to work directly… reaching out… what is specifically meant by ‘cyber vulnerabilities’.” Reuters-verified memo; Goldman/Oppenheimer 2016 ~70 percent global commercial/consumer share recited in the same wires. Fetched sUAS News; Defense One.

**Threat landscape.** Market power versus service risk judgment. 70 percent is political economy, not a vulnerability proof.

**Intelligence assessment.** [Assessment — high confidence] DJI denies consultation. [Uncertainty] What “work with the Pentagon” produces.

**Opportunity.** A DJI technical white paper dated August.

**LRRK relevance.** Campaign / Control Fabric.

**Confidence.** High on the statement.

## 04. May 22 DJI geolocation episode — Defense One’s join

*Event / publication dates: Defense One 4 August, describing May*

**Verified record — [Fact — B2]** Defense One: in May DJI told users to register with the company or suffer cuts to speed, range, even video; company said geolocation upgrade; Army memo’s two references “produced just days after DJI’s May 22 announcement; and one month after DJI added portions of Iraq and Syria to its geofence.” Velicovich: “If they can turn off our drones, what else can they do…?”

**Threat landscape.** Manufacturer kill-switch / geofence is itself a Control Fabric — useful against IS, intolerable inside a U.S. formation.

**Intelligence assessment.** [Assessment — moderate confidence] The timing join is Defense One’s, not the memo’s. [Uncertainty] May 22 announcement text not separately fetched.

**Opportunity.** The 22 May DJI notice.

**LRRK relevance.** Lab / Kestrel.

**Confidence.** Moderate on the timing inference.

## 05. Taylor hole + Part 107 — civil stack beside the ban

*Event / publication dates: 19 May; 29 August 2016*

**Verified record — [Fact — A1]** Hobbyists remain unregistered; commercial 107 stands; Army units may not use the same OEM’s kit. Fetched law as carry-forward.

**Threat landscape.** The force just grounded the airframe class the NAS still lets hobbyists fly without a number.

**Intelligence assessment.** [Assessment — high confidence] Three-track America: banned in Army, certificated in commerce, anonymous in hobby.

**Opportunity.** A DoD-wide follow-on.

**LRRK relevance.** Control Fabric / Watch.

**Confidence.** High on the split.

## Forward indicators

Ranked watchlist as of the collection cutoff (what a Watch desk would have monitored next).

1. Other-service DJI orders.
2. Unclassified ARL/Navy findings.
3. NDAA language on C-UAS and registration restore.
4. Next MQ-9 theater loss.
5. Sea Hunter MCM payload test (later recitals say August 2017 — not used as A1).

> **Collection integrity.** Memo text fetched via sUAS News; Defense One confirmation fetched. 2018 Sea Hunter “August 2017 MCM payload” recital not used as an August 2017 Fact. October Yemen MQ-9 excluded. No classified finding invented.


*LRRK — security assurance for systems that sense, move, and act.*

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