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LrrK Kinematic Software Danger Report

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# LrrK Kinematic Software Danger Report

**LRRK Watch / Software Assurance** — Monthly filing.

| Field | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Collection cutoff | 30 September 2015 |
| Platform | Quiet Systems |
| Series | DKSR-M-2015-09 |
| Status | short |
| Data label | Open-source intelligence // LRRK analytic product |
| Handling | Public-source material. Retrospective monthly. Image rights require separate verification before publication. |

## Executive read

### BLUF

First in-window conference paper that names APM, PX4, Pixhawk, and Mission Planner as a shared open-autopilot attack surface. Design flaws, not a CVE.

### Key judgments

1. **[Assessment — High confidence]** 30 September 2015, 14:00, Virus Bulletin 2015, Prague.
2. **[Assessment — High confidence]** This is the verified 3DR-related case in the window. No 3DR Solo CVE found.
3. **[Uncertainty]** How far live hijack of Mission Planner was demonstrated versus described.

### Analytic labels

- **Fact** — verified reporting or primary record
- **Assessment** — analytic judgment
- **Inference** — reasoned but not directly observed
- **Uncertainty** — unresolved information gap

### Source grades

- **A1** — authoritative primary record / directly confirmed
- **B1–B2** — generally reliable and corroborated
- **C3** — useful but requires caution

## 01. Petrovsky: Attack on the drones — APM / PX4 / Pixhawk

*Event / publication dates: 30 September 2015, Virus Bulletin 2015, Prague. SecurityWeek same day*

| Field | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Component | firmware |
| Product | 3D Robotics ArduPilotMega (APM), PX4 flight stack, Pixhawk, Mission Planner GCS |
| CVE / advisory | no CVE |
| Patch | none as a CVE |
| Exploit status | public writeup |

**Verified record — [Fact — A1] VB2015 abstract https://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2015/abstracts/attack-drones-security-vulnerabilities-unmanned-aerial-vehicles · SecurityWeek 30 Sep 2015 https://www.securityweek.com/design-flaws-expose-drones-hacker-attacks-researcher/ · later VB paper reprint (Dec 2016; do not re-date) https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2016/12/vb2015-paper-attack-drones/**

**Exposure.** Unsecured telemetry, unsigned firmware / unlocked bootloader, unauthenticated mission C2. Move/Act and update path.

**Intelligence assessment.** [Assessment — High confidence] Date and named stacks. Speaker framed design flaws (auth, secure boot, signed firmware) and said he was not aware of confirmed in-wild commercial UAV cyber takeovers. [Uncertainty] Demo depth versus description. Mixed classes — no single high-confidence taxonomy row.

**Opportunity.** Passport unsigned telemetry and unsigned firmware as separate fields. Watch Kwon 2018 / CVE-2020-10282 for the C2 half.

**LRRK relevance.** Control Fabric.

**Confidence.** High on venue and stacks. Moderate on live-hijack extent.

## Forward indicators

1. Kwon et al. MAVLink paper (August 2018).
2. CVE-2020-10282 / ICSA-26-090-02 (same unauthenticated-C2 class; out of window).

> **Collection integrity.** One talk. December 2016 VB reprint not re-dated. Taxonomy omitted (mixed design flaws, no CVE). Not padded. No exploit steps.

*LRRK — security assurance for systems that sense, move, and act.*

<p align="right"><span style="opacity:0.35;letter-spacing:0.18em;font-size:0.8em">L-C2</span></p>