LC-2 · Software Danger Reports
LrrK Kinematic Software Danger Report
Source-imported record. This page is not a QSVFF-sealed filing or a verification certificate.
# LrrK Kinematic Software Danger Report **LRRK Watch / Software Assurance** — Monthly filing. | Field | Value | | --- | --- | | Collection cutoff | 30 September 2015 | | Platform | Quiet Systems | | Series | DKSR-M-2015-09 | | Status | short | | Data label | Open-source intelligence // LRRK analytic product | | Handling | Public-source material. Retrospective monthly. Image rights require separate verification before publication. | ## Executive read ### BLUF First in-window conference paper that names APM, PX4, Pixhawk, and Mission Planner as a shared open-autopilot attack surface. Design flaws, not a CVE. ### Key judgments 1. **[Assessment — High confidence]** 30 September 2015, 14:00, Virus Bulletin 2015, Prague. 2. **[Assessment — High confidence]** This is the verified 3DR-related case in the window. No 3DR Solo CVE found. 3. **[Uncertainty]** How far live hijack of Mission Planner was demonstrated versus described. ### Analytic labels - **Fact** — verified reporting or primary record - **Assessment** — analytic judgment - **Inference** — reasoned but not directly observed - **Uncertainty** — unresolved information gap ### Source grades - **A1** — authoritative primary record / directly confirmed - **B1–B2** — generally reliable and corroborated - **C3** — useful but requires caution ## 01. Petrovsky: Attack on the drones — APM / PX4 / Pixhawk *Event / publication dates: 30 September 2015, Virus Bulletin 2015, Prague. SecurityWeek same day* | Field | Value | | --- | --- | | Component | firmware | | Product | 3D Robotics ArduPilotMega (APM), PX4 flight stack, Pixhawk, Mission Planner GCS | | CVE / advisory | no CVE | | Patch | none as a CVE | | Exploit status | public writeup | **Verified record — [Fact — A1] VB2015 abstract https://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2015/abstracts/attack-drones-security-vulnerabilities-unmanned-aerial-vehicles · SecurityWeek 30 Sep 2015 https://www.securityweek.com/design-flaws-expose-drones-hacker-attacks-researcher/ · later VB paper reprint (Dec 2016; do not re-date) https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2016/12/vb2015-paper-attack-drones/** **Exposure.** Unsecured telemetry, unsigned firmware / unlocked bootloader, unauthenticated mission C2. Move/Act and update path. **Intelligence assessment.** [Assessment — High confidence] Date and named stacks. Speaker framed design flaws (auth, secure boot, signed firmware) and said he was not aware of confirmed in-wild commercial UAV cyber takeovers. [Uncertainty] Demo depth versus description. Mixed classes — no single high-confidence taxonomy row. **Opportunity.** Passport unsigned telemetry and unsigned firmware as separate fields. Watch Kwon 2018 / CVE-2020-10282 for the C2 half. **LRRK relevance.** Control Fabric. **Confidence.** High on venue and stacks. Moderate on live-hijack extent. ## Forward indicators 1. Kwon et al. MAVLink paper (August 2018). 2. CVE-2020-10282 / ICSA-26-090-02 (same unauthenticated-C2 class; out of window). > **Collection integrity.** One talk. December 2016 VB reprint not re-dated. Taxonomy omitted (mixed design flaws, no CVE). Not padded. No exploit steps. *LRRK — security assurance for systems that sense, move, and act.* <p align="right"><span style="opacity:0.35;letter-spacing:0.18em;font-size:0.8em">L-C2</span></p>