LC-2 · Software Danger Reports

LrrK Kinematic Software Danger Report

# LrrK Kinematic Software Danger Report

**LRRK Watch / Software Assurance** — Monthly filing.

| Field | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Collection cutoff | 31 July 2013 |
| Platform | Quiet Systems |
| Series | DKSR-M-2013-07 |
| Status | short |
| Data label | Open-source intelligence // LRRK analytic product |
| Handling | Public-source material. Retrospective monthly. Image rights require separate verification before publication. |

## Executive read

### BLUF

The same unauthenticated civil-GPS failure class as the 2012 UAV tests is demonstrated on a navigating yacht. Civil L1 C/A still has no authenticity check on a kinematic platform.

### Key judgments

1. **[Assessment — High confidence]** UT Austin / Cockrell public 29–30 July 2013. Experiment June (Ars: late June–early July) 2013 in international waters ~30 miles off Italy, Monaco-to-Rhodes voyage.
2. **[Assessment — High confidence]** Motor yacht White Rose of Drachs (213 ft). Same UT Radionavigation Laboratory civil GPS spoofer line as the 2012 UAV tests. Manned yacht, not a USV.
3. **[Inference — Moderate confidence]** Adjacent to the ROV/USV clause; recorded as marine kinematic, not as a USV product case.

### Analytic labels

- **Fact** — verified reporting or primary record
- **Assessment** — analytic judgment
- **Inference** — reasoned but not directly observed
- **Uncertainty** — unresolved information gap

### Source grades

- **A1** — authoritative primary record / directly confirmed
- **B1–B2** — generally reliable and corroborated
- **C3** — useful but requires caution

## 01. Civil GPS spoof of White Rose of Drachs

*Event / publication dates: Public disclosure 29–30 July 2013 (UT Austin / Cockrell). Experiment June / late June–early July 2013. Ars Technica late July 2013.*

| Field | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Component | hardware / firmware |
| Product | Motor yacht White Rose of Drachs (213 ft) ship GPS / bridge navigation. UT Radionavigation Laboratory civil GPS spoofer. |
| CVE / advisory | no CVE |
| Patch | none for civil GPS |
| Exploit status | public writeup (authorized experiment) |
| Taxonomy | CWE-345 (class) · CAPEC-148 · OWASP IoT I7 |

**Verified record — [Fact — A1]** UT Austin News, 30 July 2013; Cockrell / ASE-EM, 29 July 2013; Dan Goodin, Ars Technica, July 2013. https://news.utexas.edu/2013/07/30/spoofing-a-superyacht-at-sea/ · https://www.ae.utexas.edu/news/humphreys-research-group · https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/07/professor-spoofs-80m-superyachts-gps-receiver-on-the-high-seas/

**Exposure.** Unauthenticated civil GNSS deception of a navigating vessel. Sense collapses Move. Manned yacht, not a USV.

**Intelligence assessment.** [Assessment — High confidence] Demonstration and same-class lineage as 2012-06-A. [Assessment — Moderate confidence] “USV-adjacent” labeling — manned yacht.

**Opportunity.** Passport GNSS authentication on marine as well as air kinematic. No ATT&CK GNSS technique; no EMB3D GNSS TID.

**LRRK relevance.** Sense-Move-Act. Watch. KAT from RF to bridge navigation state.

**Confidence.** High on the demonstration. Moderate on USV-adjacent labeling.

## Forward indicators

1. Kerns et al., Journal of Field Robotics, 10 April 2014 — same 2012 UAV field work, out of range.
2. A named USV/ROV product case of the same class (none in this window).

> **Collection integrity.** One authorized marine demonstration. Manned yacht, not a USV product. No ATT&CK GNSS technique; no EMB3D GNSS TID. Not padded. Public sources only. No invented CVEs. No exploit steps.

*LRRK — security assurance for systems that sense, move, and act.*

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