# Kinematic Capability Profile

**LRRK Watch / Nation-state actor profile** — STIX 2.1 threat-actor fields applied to systems that sense, move, and act.

| Field | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Collection cutoff | 16 September 2025 |
| Platform | Quiet Systems |
| Data label | Open-source intelligence // LRRK analytic product |
| Handling | Public-source material. Image rights require separate verification before publication. |
| Actor | Malta |
| Short name | MT |
| UN membership | Member |
| Profile depth | documented |

## Executive read

### BLUF

Malta’s public kinematic record in sources used is C-UAS training by AFM Delta Company — Act as drill, systems unnamed.

### Key judgments

1. **[Assessment — Moderate confidence]** Newsbook (16 September 2025) quotes an AFM Facebook statement that Delta Company, 1st Regiment, completed C-UAS training to detect, deter, and neutralize UAS.
2. **[Assessment — Low confidence]** Equipment and instructors were not identified.
3. **[Uncertainty]** LinkedIn Heron TP / Frontex serial-number claims are not used.

### Analytic labels

- **Fact** — verified reporting or primary record
- **Assessment** — analytic judgment
- **Inference** — reasoned but not directly observed
- **Uncertainty** — unresolved information gap

### Source grades

- **A1** — authoritative primary record / directly confirmed
- **B1–B2** — generally reliable and corroborated
- **C3** — useful but requires caution

## Identity

STIX 2.1 Identity + Threat Actor. Values from the open vocabularies only.

| STIX field | Value |
| --- | --- |
| name | Malta |
| aliases | Republic of Malta / Armed Forces of Malta |
| identity_class | organization |
| threat_actor_types | nation-state |
| roles | sponsor |
| resource_level | nation-state |
| sophistication | minimal |
| primary_motivation | organizational-gain |
| secondary_motivations | none established |
| goals | Sourced: C-UAS training response to evolving aerial threats. Uncertainty: owned ISR UAS types. |


## Intent and targeting

**[Fact]** AFM statement: enhance response to evolving aerial threats. **[Assessment]** Intent is point defence / shoreline C-UAS, not a sourced MALE campaign.

## Capability — Sense

**[Uncertainty]** Detect is named in the training aim; sensors are not.

## Capability — Move

**[Uncertainty]** not established for organic UAS.

## Capability — Act

**[Fact]** Training to neutralize UAS; photo language describes a soldier aiming a shotgun at a drone. **[Assessment]** Act is infantry C-UAS drill. **[Uncertainty]** Dedicated C-UAS product names are not established.

## Inventory

| Domain | Status | Named systems (sourced) | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Air UAS | not established |  | Police tethered-UAS tender not used as AFM inventory |
| Surface USV | not established |  | Collection gap |
| Subsurface UUV / ROV | not established |  | Collection gap |
| C-UAS | documented | Unnamed AFM C-UAS training capability | Delta Company, 1st Regiment |

## Industrial base and supply chain

**[Uncertainty]** No Maltese UAS factory established. A 2025 police tethered-UAS award appears in tender aggregators and is civil/police, not entered as military inventory.

## Observed employment

**[Fact]** Training exercises publicised 16 September 2025. **[Uncertainty]** Live engagements are not established.

## Relationships

- `attributed-to` — Armed Forces of Malta.
- `related-to` — none established for suppliers.

## LRRK turn-back

Moves a thin **Act / Watch** training object. No Passport factory. No Campaign.

## Forward indicators

- Raise: a named AFM or Frontex type on an official page; a C-UAS product buy.
- Lower: no further public C-UAS training.
- Reclassify toward baseline: if training is not repeated and no system is named.

## Sources

Numbered. Named outlet, date, URL, grade. Dead or unverified links are a form defect.

1. Newsbook Malta, 16 September 2025, https://newsbook.com.mt/en/afm-conducts-anti-drone-drills/ — B1–B2
2. United Nations, Member States list, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states — A1

> **Collection integrity.** Times of Malta C-UAS piece was blocked (403). LinkedIn Heron TP claims are omitted. Police tethered-UAS tender aggregators are not AFM inventory. `not established` is a gap.

*LRRK — security assurance for systems that sense, move, and act.*

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