# LrrK Def Cuts **LRRK Watch / Conference Record** — Public DEF CON / Black Hat signals on software, firmware, and hardware that move physical systems. | Field | Value | | --- | --- | | Collection cutoff | 30 July 2017 | | Platform | Quiet Systems | | Series | DC-S-04 | | Status | short | | Data label | Open-source intelligence // LRRK analytic product | | Handling | Public-source material. Image rights require separate verification before publication. | ## Executive read ### BLUF Bishop Fox’s *Game of Drones* — Black Hat USA 2017 Arsenal plus DEF CON 25 main stage — is one research program: first-generation C-UAS products (nets, birds, RF denial, directed energy) were field-tested against a custom pentest UAV and shown to be immature or ineffective. ### Key judgments 1. **[Assessment — High confidence]** Inventory 2017-01 (DEF CON 25, 29 July 2017) and 2017-02 (Black Hat USA 2017 Arsenal Theater, 26–27 July 2017) are the same Francis Brown / David Latimer research, not two disclosures. 2. **[Assessment — High confidence]** The failure class is C-UAS product effectiveness against a pentest airframe (DangerDrone), not a vendor CVE on a flight stack. No CVE, Exploit-DB ID, or talk-tied GitHub URL was found. 3. **[Inference — Moderate confidence]** A Passport that records “C-UAS present” without a field result against a non-cooperative airframe over-claims Act on the defended site. ## 01. First-generation C-UAS products fail a field test against a pentest UAV *Event / publication dates: Black Hat USA 2017 Arsenal Theater demo, 26–27 July 2017; DEF CON 25 main stage, 29 July 2017 (16:00 PT, 45 min). Collection cutoff is DEF CON 25 Sunday, 30 July 2017.* | Field | Value | | --- | --- | | Venue | DEF CON; Black Hat USA | | Component | hardware | | Product | first-generation C-UAS (nets, birds, RF denial, directed energy) vs Bishop Fox DangerDrone | | CVE / advisory | none found | | Patch | none | | Exploit status | public writeup | **Verified record — [Fact — A1]** Speakers Francis Brown and David Latimer (Bishop Fox). DEF CON 25 title *Game of Drones: Putting the Emerging "Drone Defense" Market to the Test*; official speaker page https://www.defcon.org/html/defcon-25/dc-25-speakers.html; media.defcon.org updated slides (`DEF CON 25 - Brown-and-Latimer-Game-of-Drones-Drone-Defense-Market-UPDATED.pdf`) and video (`DEF CON 25 - Francis Brown, David Latimer - Game of Drones - Putting the Emerging Drone Defense Market to the Test.mp4`); YouTube after-record `jwNrcuYAhj8`; speaker-firm page https://bishopfox.com/resources/def-con-25-2017-game-of-drones. Black Hat USA 2017 Arsenal title *Game of Drones: Putting the Emerging 'Drone Defense' Market to the Test - Arsenal Theater Demo*; official Arsenal listing https://www.blackhat.com/us-17/arsenal.html. InfoconDB is a cross-check only. **[Fact — A1]** CVE / advisory: none found. Exploit-DB ID: none found. GitHub research repo: none found (DangerDrone v2.0 announced as a public pentest-quadcopter release; no talk-tied GitHub URL located). Exploit-status on both venue records: public writeup. **Exposure.** Adjacent C-UAS: the defended site’s Act against an incoming UAV. The test article (DangerDrone) is itself a kinematic platform; the finding is that nets, birds, RF denial, and directed energy then on the market did not reliably stop it. Sense on the C-UAS side is implied by missed or ineffective engagements, not by a new UAV CVE. **Intelligence assessment.** **[Assessment — High confidence]** Main stage plus Arsenal is one research program; double-counting would invent a second talk. **[Assessment — High confidence]** Physical consequence is an airframe that still arrives — the C-UAS layer fails to deny Move into the defended volume. **[Uncertainty]** Individual product SKUs are not Passport-named in the inventory; “first-generation C-UAS” stays a class. **[Inference — Moderate confidence]** Later evasion talks (Interceptor 2018, spread-spectrum disposable drones 2023) assume this market-immaturity baseline. **Opportunity.** Passport a C-UAS claim only with a field result against a non-cooperative, non-DJI-default airframe. Campaign “C-UAS installed” as unevidenced Act. Lab effectiveness as a product question, not as a flight-stack CVE. Watch for vendor responses this 2017 record did not produce as advisories. **LRRK relevance.** Adjacent C-UAS on the kinematic trust path. Watch and Campaign for over-claimed defenses. Lab / Kestrel across C-UAS classes (kinetic net, animal, RF denial, directed energy). DangerDrone is a test article, not the Campaign target. **Confidence.** High on the two official venue records, media.defcon.org after-record, and the single-research merge. Moderate on unnamed product SKUs. Nil on CVE, EDB, and a talk-tied repo. ## Forward indicators 1. A C-UAS vendor advisory or third-party retest answers the 2017 field-test class with named products and dates. 2. A later BH/DC talk treats C-UAS effectiveness as a Passport item rather than a market demo. 3. A talk-tied DangerDrone v2.0 repo or catalog ID appears and can be cited as a named record only. > **Collection integrity.** Built from leftover inventory 2017-01 and 2017-02 only (same research: DEF CON 25 main + Black Hat USA Arsenal). Official sources: defcon.org DC25 speakers; media.defcon.org DC25 presentations and video-and-slides; blackhat.com US-17 Arsenal; Bishop Fox after-record page. InfoconDB cross-check only. Black Hat USA 2017 dedicated kinematic briefings remain NIL (jammer-hunting survey excluded). Black Hat Europe / Asia 2017 remain NIL. R00tz *Drone Wars* (2017-03) is a separate youth-village item and is not merged here. Slides and video treated as metadata; pentest-UAV build steps, SD images, and engagement procedures excluded. No invented talks. CVE / EDB / GitHub / exploit-status copied from the inventory: none found / none found / none found / public writeup. *LRRK — security assurance for systems that sense, move, and act.*

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